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ABSTRACT 
  The Internet era has brought a new battlefield to U.S.-trademark-
law disputes: domain names. Trademark owners have vigorously 
challenged the registration of domain names that consist of—or 
merely include—their trademarked terms, suing these domain-name 
registrants in U.S. courts for trademark infringement. During the 
early years of the Internet, courts often found consumer confusion—
and thus trademark infringement—in these cases. As Internet use has 
developed, however, many courts have not recognized the growing 
sophistication of online consumers. This Note proposes that U.S. 
courts adapt their analyses to recognize evolving consumer behavior 
and expectations. This updated analysis, based on a 2010 Ninth 
Circuit opinion, will promote trademark law’s historical focus on 
accuracy by encouraging courts to recognize the right of domain-
name registrants to engage in accurate, nonconfusing speech. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Farzad and Lisa Tabari operated their auto-broker 
business, Fast Imports, from two different URLs: “buy-a-lexus.com” 
and “buyorleaselexus.com.”1 As entrepreneurial auto brokers, the 
Tabaris were “personal shoppers of the automotive world,” 
contacting authorized dealers on behalf of customers to find “the best 
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 1. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1174–75, 1181 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
REED IN FINAL 10/6/2011  6:48:51 PM 
212 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:211 
 
combination of location, availability and price.”2 Although the 
Tabaris were not specifically authorized to conduct this business by 
Toyota, the distributor of Lexus automobiles, they sold consumers 
authentic Lexus vehicles.3 The Tabaris’ website contained no 
photographs of Lexus vehicles or images of the Lexus logo.4 Rather, 
it contained a disclaimer in large font at the top of the page stating: 
“We are not an authorized Lexus dealer or affiliated in any way with 
Lexus. We are an Independent Auto Broker.”5 Nevertheless, Toyota 
brought a trademark-infringement lawsuit challenging not the legality 
of the Tabaris’ business model, but the legality of their choice of 
domain names.6 
“Lexus,” as a word that identifies and distinguishes a vehicle 
brand, falls under the definition of a trademark, which includes “any 
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” used in 
commerce to identify and distinguish goods and services.7 In this 
example, the trademarked term, “Lexus,” appeared in the domain 
names from which the Tabaris conducted their business. These uses 
were not licensed or authorized by the trademark owner, but 
appeared to reference the trademark owner’s company. Although the 
Internet has developed rapidly over the last several decades, the state 
of the law surrounding domain-name trademarks remains unclear. As 
trademark-law commentator Professor Eric Goldman stated in 2010, 
“I still have no idea when businesses outside a manufacturer’s 
authorized channel can legally include the manufacturer’s trademark 
in their name[s]. Each case seems to be sui generis.”8 This legal 
uncertainty discourages website creators from using any trademarked 
 2. Id. at 1174. 
 3. Id. at 1174–75. 
 4. Id. at 1175. The website had been revised since Toyota’s initial contact with the 
Tabaris. Id. at 1175, 1181. 
 5. Id. at 1181–82. 
 6. Id. at 1175. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide 
intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this 
chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is 
unknown.”). 
 8. Eric Goldman, Funky Ninth Circuit Opinion on Domain Names and Nominative Use—
Toyota v. Tabari, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 14, 2010, 1:08 PM), http://blog.eric
goldman.org/archives/2010/07/funky_ninth_cir.htm. 
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terms in their domain names even though some such uses may be 
legal, thereby creating a “classic chilling effect.”9 
This Note approaches the modern problem of domain-name 
conflicts through the lens of trademark law’s historical focus on 
accuracy. Because most domain-name cases rely on outdated 
conceptions of Internet user behavior,10 this Note analyzes the new 
framework offered by the 2010 Ninth Circuit case Toyota Motor 
Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari.11 Tabari provides an updated 
understanding of the twenty-first century’s more sophisticated 
consumer behavior, and it presents a theory of “sensible agnosticism” 
toward online consumer expectations.12 The Ninth Circuit’s approach 
raises the bar for consumer confusion in trademark cases, focusing on 
the most relevant—not the most inept—consumers.13 This Note 
ultimately recommends the adoption of Tabari’s updated analysis in 
future domain-name cases. 
This analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part I outlines a brief 
history of trademark law, focusing on its purposes. Part II explores 
the application of trademark law to domain names and discusses the 
field’s overlap with cybersquatting law. Part III proposes a new 
framework for trademark-infringement analysis in domain-name 
cases and examines the challenges of applying this framework to 
future cases. 
I.  HISTORICAL PURPOSES OF TRADEMARK LAW 
Despite the recent vintage of domain-name disputes, it is 
important to explore the historical underpinnings of trademark law 
before applying it to modern domain-name cases. Understanding the 
values underlying trademark law helps to clarify the types of behavior 
that trademark-infringement actions should protect and those that 
they should prevent. These values thus serve as a useful guide for 
evaluating the types of domain names that should qualify as 
trademark infringements. This Part first explores the purposes behind 
trademark law and the common themes that can be derived from 
 9. William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 52 (2008). 
 10. See, e.g., infra notes 94–106 and accompanying text. 
 11. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 12. Id. at 1179. 
 13. See id. at 1176 (explaining the importance of focusing on the reasonably prudent 
consumer, as opposed to the unreasonable, imprudent consumer). 
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those purposes. It then tracks the history of trademark law as federal 
law in the United States. 
A. Purposes of Trademark Law 
Trademark law is generally thought to serve three main 
purposes: protection of consumers from confusion, goodwill 
protection of a trademark owner’s property, and promotion of fair 
competition.14 This Section first examines historic trademark 
purposes and the prevailing scholarly theories of trademark 
protection and then synthesizes the common themes within those 
theories, including their particular f
1. Historic Trademark Purposes.  Long before Coca-Cola and 
McDonald’s created their distinctive brand names, trademarks 
existed in a variety of forms.15 Originally, trademarks were symbols 
used to identify a product’s owner or origin.16 Owners branded their 
cattle to differentiate them from neighboring herds, and potters 
identified their creations with unique marks.17 As more sellers began 
marking their products, the marks’ primary purpose became 
identifying the origin of defective products.18 For example, fifteenth–
century English law required vendors to mark the swords and armor 
they sold so that consumers could easily report sellers of defective 
weapons.19 Trademarks thus developed a consumer-protection role, 
allowing consumers to hold product and service providers 
accountable for defects. Consumers could notify their peer consumers 
of the defects and avoid defective purchases in the future. 
 14. See, e.g., Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir. 
1952) (“[T]he common law favors competition; and it is of the essence of competition that 
competitors copy and undersell the product of an originator. The competitors do not lose their 
favored common-law position merely because someone chooses to call them ‘free riders.’”); 
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694–95 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (“The law of 
unfair competition . . . [promotes] the policy of encouraging competition from which the public 
benefits.” (footnotes omitted)); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2010) (listing trademark law’s purposes as both protecting 
consumers from confusion and protecting a trademark owner’s goodwill). 
 15. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:1. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Daniel Devoe, Note, Applying Liability Rules to Metatag Cases and Other Instances of 
Trademark Infringement on the Internet: How To Get to “No Harm, No Foul,” 90 B.U. L. REV. 
1221, 1227 (2010). 
 18. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:1. 
 19. Id. 
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2. Competing Theories of Trademark Protection.  The Chicago 
school of law and economics explains trademark law’s purpose as 
“trying to promote economic efficiency.”20 This theory, first 
propounded in the 1980s, has become the common understanding of 
trademark law in the United States.21 According to proponents of this 
theory, trademark law serves two functions: “First, trademarks lessen 
consumer search costs by making products and producers easier to 
identify in the marketplace, and second, trademarks encourage 
producers to invest in quali[t]y by ensuring that they, and not their 
competitors, reap the reputation-related rewards of that 
investment.”22 The Chicago school’s approach contends that the 
United States has developed economically efficient trademark laws to 
fulfill these functions.23 Both functions aim to protect the interests of 
consumers, rather than the interests of producers, as they ensure low 
search costs and high-quality products for consumers. 
In contrast to the Chicago school’s account of the development 
of trademark law, Professor Mark P. McKenna argues that early 
English and American courts were more concerned about property 
rights than economic efficiencies.24 McKenna accuses the Chicago 
school of imposing its “normative agenda” on courts that did not 
traditionally recognize these economic-efficiency goals.25 In 
particular, McKenna criticizes the “claim that improving the quality 
of information in the marketplace is the only legitimate goal and that 
deviations from that goal are unjustified.”26 Based on his examination 
of early English and American case law, McKenna argues that these 
 20. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987). 
 21. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
623–24 (2004) (“The Chicago School of law and economics has long offered a totalizing and, for 
many, quite definitive theory of American trademark law. . . . It has been adopted at the highest 
levels of American law. No alternative account of trademark doctrine currently exists.” 
(footnote omitted)); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) (“It would be difficult to overstate the level of 
consensus among commentators that the goal of trademark law is—and always has been—to 
improve the quality of information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search 
costs.”). For the Supreme Court’s acceptance of this analysis, see, for example, Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995). 
 22. Beebe, supra note 21, at 623. 
 23. Id. at 623–24. 
 24. McKenna, supra note 21, at 1848. 
 25. Id. at 1842. 
 26. Id. at 1847. 
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cases had an overwhelming concern for producers’ property rights, 
rather than for consumer protection.27 
Professor McKenna also finds that likelihood of consumer 
confusion was not a determining factor in early trademark cases; he 
argues that courts actually allowed genuinely confusing uses if “the 
plaintiff could not show that the defendant’s actions were likely to 
divert customers who otherwise would have gone to the plaintiff.”28 
McKenna differentiates these historic cases from the twentieth-
century expansion of trademark law, which removed the requirement 
of direct competition between parties.29 He attributes this change to a 
decision among courts to recognize “the possibility of consumer 
confusion as an evil in itself.”30 
3. Understanding the Multiple Functions of Trademark Law.  
Many scholars believe that trademark law should be guided by a 
focus on both consumers and producers. As Professor Robert G. 
Bone notes in a 2006 article, early judges and commentators actually 
expressed concerns about protecting both sellers and the public from 
deceptive practices.31 These dual concerns “make[] it very difficult for 
the historian who wishes to determine whether nineteenth century 
courts cared mostly about protecting sellers or mostly about 
protecting consumers.”32 Professor Bone further argues that early 
courts had “no need to draw a sharp distinction” because “the two 
goals were mutually consistent and reinforcing—trademark law gave 
remedies to sellers and in so doing helped both sellers and 
consumers.”33 
 27. See id. at 1848 (“In reality, ‘traditional’ American trademark law was unapologetically 
producer-oriented. . . . Trademark law primarily sought to regulate the relationship between 
competitors; any benefits to consumers were secondary.”). 
 28. Id. at 1841 (noting that courts historically focused on consumer deception only as it 
contributed to unfair competition because they were concerned primarily with protecting 
producers). 
 29. Id. at 1843; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:14. 
 30. McKenna, supra note 21, at 1843. 
 31. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 560 (2006) (“Nineteenth century jurists frequently 
referred to both goals in the same passage without sharply distinguishing between them.”). 
 32. Id. at 561 n.59 (“The problem with a project like Professor McKenna’s is similar to 
interpreting an Escher print. Everything depends on what one sees as the foreground 
(protecting consumers or protecting sellers) and what one sees as the background—and both 
perspectives are necessary to fully appreciate the whole.”). 
 33. Id. at 560–61. 
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Similarly, leading trademark scholar Professor J. Thomas 
McCarthy concludes that both goals are vital to historical and modern 
trademark law: 
[T]o select as paramount either protection of the trademark 
property or protection of consumers would be to oversimplify the 
dual goals of trademark law, both historical and modern. Trademark 
law serves to protect both consumers from deception and confusion 
over trade symbols and to protect the plaintiff’s infringed trademark 
as property.34 
 Understanding both views of trademark law reveals the many 
different functions of the law—from achieving potential economic 
efficiencies to fostering fair competition. It is a mistake to emphasize 
one perspective unduly over another, and it is necessary to recognize 
the commonalities among, and conflicts between, the different values 
that trademark law protects. 
Inherent in both the consumer-protection and property-rights 
conceptions of trademark law is a desire to promote accuracy in the 
marketplace and to prevent falsity and deceit.35 Although the goals of 
promoting accuracy and avoiding confusion may seem like two sides 
of the same coin, courts have drawn distinctions between the two, 
tolerating confusion when accurate information is given to 
consumers.36 Focusing on accuracy holds disseminators of false or 
misleading information accountable while at the same time giving 
more leeway to good-faith uses of trademarks that happen to result in 
confusion. 
B. United States Federal Trademark Law 
Unlike patent and copyright law, trademark law is not grounded 
in the U.S. Constitution.37 The Supreme Court affirmed this fact in 
 34. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:2. 
 35. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 31, at 554 (stating that trademark law’s “core mission” 
should be “to ensure the efficient and honest communication of product quality information to 
consumers”); Devoe, supra note 17, at 1236 (“[T]here is a general consensus that the primary 
purpose of trademark protection is to supply consumers with accurate information regarding the 
source of the good.”). 
 36. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123 (2004) 
(holding in a comparative-advertising case that “fair use can occur along with some degree of 
confusion”). 
 37. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879). Patent and copyright laws were 
established in the U.S. Constitution’s Progress Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
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1879 when it declared unconstitutional Congress’s first trademark 
law, just nine years after the law was passed.38 In reaching that 
decision, the Court explained that the clause in the Constitution 
authorizing limited exclusive rights for “inventions and discoveries” 
pertains to patents and copyrights, but not to trademarks.39 It 
explained that “[a]ny attempt . . . to identify the essential 
characteristics of a trade-mark with inventions and discoveries in the 
arts and sciences, or with the writings of authors, will show that the 
effort is surrounded with insurmountable difficulties. The ordinary 
trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery.”40 
Instead, the Court declared, the only potential authorization for 
federal trademark laws is within the Commerce Clause.41 
In the decades following this decision, Congress passed limited 
statutes authorizing the registration of trademarks used in commerce 
abroad and with Native American tribes.42 Then, in 1905, Congress 
passed a broader act that authorized the registration of trademarks 
used in interstate commerce. This statute, however, still contained 
numerous restrictions that prevented Americans from registering.43 
Moreover, foreign jurisdictions often refused to register trademarked 
terms without proof of prior trademark registration in the owner’s 
native country, so the act’s limitations prevented Americans from 
registering their potential trademarks abroad as well.44 Over the next 
few decades, Congress attempted to address the act’s weaknesses by 
enacting “a crazy quilt of modifications and amendments.”45 
While the United States was limiting trademark rights more than 
its foreign counterparts, the country’s rapid commercial growth and 
developments in advertising gave new significance to trademark 
ownership.46 After the Civil War, several factors combined to expand 
commerce beyond local and regional markets and into national 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”). 
 38. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 99; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:3. 
 39. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93–94. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 94–95. 
 42. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:3. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bone, supra note 31, at 575–77. 
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markets.47 First, growth in population, urban areas, and per capita 
income created a national consumer base, and technology increased 
productivity to meet these new demands.48 Next, to connect producers 
and consumers, transcontinental railroad construction made mail-
order service possible across the country.49 Accordingly, marketing 
increased to attract national audiences, and advertisers began to 
recognize the need for brand recognition to retain repeat customers.50 
As product and service providers relied more heavily on consumer 
association of their goods and services with their trademarks, federal 
law “remained inadequate to cope with the realities of twentieth 
century commerce and brand names.”51 
In response to this growing need for trademark protection, 
Congress enacted comprehensive trademark protection, establishing 
both substantive and procedural rights in the 1946 Lanham Act.52 
Looking at the Act’s legislative history, the Supreme Court, in 
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,53 identified the 
Act’s two goals as preventing consumer confusion and protecting 
trademark owners’ goodwill: 
[B]latant trademark infringement inhibits competition and subverts 
both goals of the Lanham Act. By applying a trademark to goods 
produced by one other than the trademark’s owner, the infringer 
deprives the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and 
money to obtain. At the same time, the infringer deprives consumers 
of their ability to distinguish among the goods of competing 
manufacturers.54 
The text of the Lanham Act, however, requires only proof of a 
plaintiff’s ownership of a mark and proof that a defendant’s infringing 
use of the mark creates a likelihood of consumer confusion, thus 
making the likelihood-of-confusion test “the touchstone of trademark 
infringement.”55 In addition to confusion about the source of a 
 47. Id. at 576. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 576–77. 
 50. Devoe, supra note 17, at 1227–28. 
 51. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:3. 
 52. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 53. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
 54. Id. at 854 n.14 (citations omitted). 
 55. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:1 (“[A]s the U.S. Supreme Court has observed: ‘The 
law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit; its general concern is 
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product or service, the Lanham Act expanded the consumer-
confusion test to include confusion about the “affiliation, connection, 
or association” between the plaintiff and the defendant and about the 
plaintiff’s “sponsorship . . . or approval” of the defendant’s products.56 
Since enacting the Lanham Act, Congress has amended it at an 
increasing rate.57 The Trademark Law Revision Act of 198858 
contained the most comprehensive revisions to a trademark act since 
the Lanham Act itself. Most significantly, the Trademark Law 
Revision Act created an “intent-to-use” application, which authorized 
registration by American firms with a “bona fide intent to use the 
mark in commerce.”59 This new application helped American 
businesses compete on the international stage, “bring[ing] [the 
Lanham Act] up to date to enter the new marketing environment of 
the twenty-first century.”60 
Congress further extended trademark law with the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 199561 and subsequent Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act of 2006.62 Trademark dilution consists of “[a] 
weakening or reduction in the ability of a mark to clearly distinguish 
only one source” through either “blurring” or “tarnishment.”63 
Federal dilution law applies only to trademarks that have achieved 
fame on a national scale and remains controversial among scholars 
and judges alike.64 
with protecting consumers from confusion as to source.’” (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989))); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006) 
(describing the test for trademark infringement). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
 57. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:5. 
 58. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. I, 102 Stat. 3935, 3935–
48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 59. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:9. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2006)). 
 62. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §§ 24:93, :95–:96. 
 63. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:67. 
 64. See, e.g., id. (explaining that “the issue of whether the dilution idea is a good one is still 
controversial and remains to be definitely resolved”); J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a 
Trademark Has Been Diluted: Theories or Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 713, 726 (2004) (describing 
the “doctrinal puzzlement and judicial incomprehension” created by the trademark dilution 
doctrine); cf. Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark—Trade Identity 
Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 618, 632 (1976) (“Some prudent 
supplementing seems now in order to structure trade identity law toward meeting the needs and 
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Expanding congressional protection of trademarks has occurred 
as trademarks are entering more areas of speech than ever before. 
The early twenty-first century’s “most widely shared cultural 
references now come from advertising, not literature or scripture.”65 
As more public and private speech has moved online, “[i]ncreasingly, 
the subjects of shared conversation are branded companies, branded 
goods and services, or branded ‘experiences.’”66 In evaluating how to 
shape trademark law in the online sphere, it is important to maintain 
a focus on promoting accurate communication between producers 
and consumers as well as accurate associations between producers 
and their products and services. 
II.  APPLICATIONS OF TRADEMARK LAW TO DOMAIN NAMES 
As the Internet began to grow into a worldwide phenomenon, 
trademark owners perceived a growing threat in the form of 
skyrocketing domain-name registrations. To explain how trademark 
law should apply to domain names, this Part first examines the history 
and specifics of domain-name registration, and then explains the 
unique attributes of domain names. Next, this Part discusses the 
options available for resolving domain-name trademark conflicts and 
concludes with a discussion of the uncertainty remaining in this area. 
A. Domain-Name Registration 
1. Domain-Name-Registration Processes.  Domain names are 
“easy-to-remember names” that help users locate computers on the 
Internet.67 Every computer with a connection to the Internet has a 
unique numeric address to which other computers can send bits.68 
These numeric addresses, known as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, 
are difficult for human users to remember, and “if you get two digits 
transposed, you’ll end up somewhere entirely different.”69 The 
Domain Name System (DNS) was created to translate unique 
realities of today’s commercial arena. The emergence of the anti-dilution concept and statutes 
may be seen correctly as a positive step in that direction.”). 
 65. McGeveran, supra note 9, at 58. 
 66. Id. at 57. 
 67. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,741 (June 10, 
1998) (statement of policy). 
 68. Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 149–50 (2000). 
 69. Id. at 150. 
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alphanumeric domain names into IP numbers.70 DNS maps “familiar” 
domain names to ensure that the correct IP addresses are located.71 
To locate a website, users click on links or type in website 
addresses, also called uniform resource locators (URLs).72 A domain 
name is anything that follows the “http://www.” or “http://” part of a 
URL.73 For example, “http://www.google.com” is a URL, and 
“google.com” is a domain name. A URL’s top-level domain (TLD) is 
found at the end of the domain name, but before any slashes 
indicating subdomains or sections within the website.74 Popular TLDs 
include “.com” and “.org.”75 Many trademark owners register domain 
names that include their trademarks in the second-level domains 
(SLDs) directly preceding the TLD.76 In the previous example, 
“http://www.google.com,” the SLD is “google.” Here, a company has 
registered its trademarked name in the URL’s SLD.77 
As domain-name registrations skyrocketed, trademark owners 
sought to oust domain-name registrants who owned URLs that 
contained their trademarked terms.78 Fueling these conflicts was the 
instability caused by the constant issuance of new “Domain Name 
Dispute Policies” by Network Solutions, the United States’ appointed 
registrar of domain names in the “.com,” “.edu,” “.net,” “.org,” and 
“.gov” TLDs.79 The policies were aimed at reducing the registrar’s 
own liability, but they eventually resulted in litigation against 
Network Solutions for allowing the registration of infringing domain 
 70. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Sara D. Sunderland, Note, Domain Name Speculation: Are We Playing Whac-A-Mole?, 
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 465, 467 (2010). 
 73. Id. 
 74. PAUL ALBITZ & CRICKET LIU, DNS AND BIND § 2.1.2 (3d ed. 1998). 
 75. Sunderland, supra note 72, at 467 (noting that the TLDs “.com” and “.org” were 
originally intended for commercial and nonprofit use, respectively, but that the distinction is no 
longer enforced). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Google Permissions, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/permissions/guidelines.html 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (noting Google’s ownership of the trademark “Google”). 
 78. See, e.g., Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Va.) 
(determining whether a domain name infringed a trademark, despite compliance with Network 
Solutions’ “first-come-first-served” policy), aff’d, 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997); Management of 
Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,742 (June 10, 1998) (statement of 
policy) (“Conflicts between trademark holders and domain name holders are becoming more 
common. Mechanisms for resolving these conflicts are expensive and cumbersome.”). 
 79. JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION LAW 767 (3d ed. 2001). 
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names.80 Dissatisfaction with Network Solutions led to the eventual 
creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), an international, not-for-profit entity established 
in November 1998.81 ICANN accredits companies across the world to 
serve as domain-name registrars.82 As of 2011, ICANN offered 
accreditation for sixteen different TLDs, ranging from “.mobi” for 
mobile products and services to “.travel” for travel industry entities.83 
Registration happens on a first-come, first-served basis and requires 
minimal effort; it usually consists of payment of a small fee for the 
right to use the domain name for one year, with the option to renew.84 
Throughout the various iterations of domain-name registration, the 
process has never been overseen by any government’s actual 
trademark registrar, but has instead consistently been managed across 
disparate international entities.85 
2. Limited Number of Domain Names.  A limited number of 
possible domain names exist because “[e]ach complete domain name 
must be unique.”86 This restriction challenges trademark law’s 
assumption that “it is possible for a multiplicity of entities to own the 
same or similar trademarks for different products and in different 
geographic areas.”87 The finite supply of domain names can pose 
difficulties when companies share the same or similar names and, like 
 80. Id.; see also, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 
950 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Lockheed asserts that NSI directly infringed and diluted its mark by 
accepting [domain-name] registrations[ of terms identical or similar to Lockheed’s service 
mark]. Lockheed also asserts that NSI is liable as a contributory infringer because NSI did not 
comply with Lockheed’s demands to cancel the registrations.”), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 81. GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 79, at 799–801; see also Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (Nov. 25, 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-
memorandum.htm (announcing the creation of ICANN). 
 82. ICANN-Accredited Registrars, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/accredited-
list.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (listing the domain-name registrars accredited by ICANN). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Sunderland, supra note 72, at 468. 
 85. The United States proposed a system more closely aligned with its own trademark law, 
but that system was accused of being an “inappropriate attempt to establish [U.S.] trademark 
law as the law of the Internet.” Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 
31,741, 31,746 (June 10, 1998) (statement of policy). 
 86. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 25:72. 
 87. GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 79, at 768. 
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“most companies[,] want their primary trademark to serve as their 
second-level domain.”88 
For example, the popular global jewelry company named 
Pandora cannot operate its website at “pandora.com” because that 
domain name is reserved by a different popular company in an 
unrelated field—Pandora, an Internet radio service.89 Instead, the 
Pandora jewelry company must operate its consumer-facing website 
at “pandora.net.”90 The Internet can direct users only based on what 
they type in, and it does not know if users are actually interested in 
Pandora jewelry when they incorrectly type in the “pandora.com” 
domain name. 
Although this dilemma suggests a high risk of confusion with 
domain names, it also shows the necessity of allowing a certain 
amount of confusion to exist. As was demonstrated by the Network 
Solutions debacle, domain-name registrars are not equipped to 
regulate the prioritization of trademark use in domain names.91 
Further, in many instances, it is unclear which users should have 
priority. Returning to the earlier example, the Pandora jewelry 
company was founded eighteen years earlier than the Internet radio 
service, but the radio service conducts all of its business online and 
could not function without its website.92 Neither business appears to 
be operating in a deceitful or fraudulent manner, and both companies 
would promote trademark law’s goals of accuracy by operating under 
the “pandora.com” domain name. Prioritization based on company 
revenue or audience size would result in an ever-changing calculation, 
 88. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 222 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 89. Compare PANDORA INTERNET RADIO, http://www.pandora.com (last visited Sept. 5, 
2011) (hosting the website of the Pandora Internet radio service), with PANDORA, http://www.
pandora.net (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) [hereinafter PANDORA, http://www.pandora.net] (hosting 
the website of the Pandora jewelry company). 
 90. See PANDORA, http://www.pandora.net, supra note 89 (hosting the website of the 
Pandora jewelry company). The Pandora jewelry company operates additional domain names 
containing the “Pandora” trademark with the “.com” TLD. See, e.g., PANDORA, http://www.
pandoragroup.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (hosting an investor-facing website); PANDORA, 
http://www.pandoramoa.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) [hereinafter PANDORA, http://www.
pandoramoa.com] (hosting the website of the Pandora jewelry company’s Mall of America 
boutique). 
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81. 
 92. Compare About Pandora, PANDORA INTERNET RADIO, http://www.pandora.com/
corporate (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (noting that the Pandora Internet radio service began 
operating in 2000), with About Pandora, PANDORA, http://www.pandora.net/en-us/pandora-
company/about-pandora (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (stating that the Pandora jewelry company 
was founded in 1982). 
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disturbing the stability of consumer expectations. Additionally, 
setting aside domain names for certain prioritized users could result 
in waste, as the first registrant to appear may be ready to begin using 
the domain name immediately upon registration. When compared 
with the Pandora’s box of potential prioritization theories, the first-
come, first-served policy of Internet domain-name registration seems 
quite preferable. 
B. Unique Attributes of Domain Names 
Domain names present several unique challenges in trademark-
infringement actions. This Section examines their role in identifying 
content sources and discusses the problems that their lack of context 
can cause when similarly named businesses are placed side-by-side 
online. 
1. Role as Source Identifiers.  Domain names are sometimes 
regarded as source identifiers, in addition to their primary function as 
locator addresses. In Panavision International L.P. v. Toeppen,93 the 
Ninth Circuit quoted a 1997 legal periodical proposing this secondary 
purpose of domain names: 
The domain name serves a dual purpose. It marks the location of the 
site within cyberspace, much like a postal address in the real world, 
but it may also indicate to users some information as to the content 
of the site, and, in instances of well-known trade names or 
trademarks, may provide information as to the origin of the contents 
of the site.94 
Adopting this possibility wholeheartedly, the court “reject[ed] [the] 
premise that a domain name is nothing more than an address” and 
asserted that “[a] significant purpose of a domain name is to identify 
the entity that owns the web site.”95 The court went on to describe its 
rationale, stating that “[a] customer who is unsure about a company’s 
domain name will often guess that the domain name is also the 
 93. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 94. Id. at 1327 n.8 (quoting Peter Brown, New Issues in Internet Litigation, in 17TH 
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW: THE EVOLVING LAW OF THE INTERNET 151, 156 
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. G4-3987, 
1997)). 
 95. Id. at 1327. 
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company’s name.”96 This method of “[u]sing a company’s name or 
trademark as a domain name is . . . the easiest way to locate that 
company’s web site.”97 
The court specifically mentioned that “[u]se of a ‘search engine’ 
can turn up hundreds of web sites, and there is nothing equivalent to 
a phone book or directory assistance for the Internet.”98 Instead, 
“potential customers of Panavision will be discouraged if they cannot 
find its web page by typing in ‘Panavision.com,’ but instead are forced 
to wade through hundreds of web sites,” thereby diluting Panavision’s 
trademark value.99 The court explained that Panavision’s potential 
consumers may be confused if they visit “panavision.com” expecting 
to find Panavision’s official site, and instead land on a completely 
different website.100 Describing this daunting situation, the court 
“echo[ed]” another court’s warning that “‘[p]rospective users of 
plaintiff’s services who mistakenly access defendant’s web site may 
fail to continue to search for plaintiff’s own home page, due to anger, 
frustration or the belief that plaintiff’s home page does not exist.’”101 
The language in this case, particularly regarding the inaccuracy 
of search engines, reflects its early date: April 17, 1998.102 The opinion 
was written months before search-engine giant Google’s 
incorporation, and over a decade before search-engine Bing.com’s 
release.103 Years later, if a plaintiff’s website cannot be found on any 
leading search engine, the main cause is probably not harm 
occasioned by one defendant’s domain name.104 Although some 
frustrating searches surely continue to occur, a website’s lack of 
visibility can usually be blamed on factors like search-engine-crawl 
 96. Id. (quoting Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 
129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (quoting Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 307 (D.N.J. 1998)). 
 102. Id. at 1316. 
 103. See Google History, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/corporate/history.html 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (describing Google’s incorporation in September 1998); Press 
Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft’s New Search at Bing.com Helps People Make Better 
Decisions (May 28, 2009), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2009/may09/05-
28newsearchpr.mspx (announcing the launch of Bing.com). 
 104. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of 
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 188 (2005) (arguing that it is preferable for market 
forces and evolving technology to generate more relevant search results, rather than to rely on 
trademark law). 
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errors.105 Rather than being discredited, however, Panavision’s central 
proposition has been repeatedly affirmed.106 
Courts should be cautious about recognizing domain names as 
source identifiers, as many domain names do not accurately indicate 
the website’s title, authors, sponsors, or sources of content. Further, 
and more important, any recognition of a source-identification 
function should be limited to domain names consisting solely of a 
company or trademarked term as its SLD, like the “panavision.com” 
domain name at issue in the Ninth Circuit case.107 Nearly endless 
combinations of modifiers and alphanumeric characters could be 
added to this type of SLD to remove any source identification, such 
as “AJapanAVisionA.com” and “WingspanAVisionary.com,” or 
even “IHatePanavision.com.” Users will not anticipate that 
Panavision owns these other domain names simply because the term 
“panavision” is contained within them. As Professor Jennifer Litman 
has stated, “[T]he assumption that domain name space is and should 
be an extension of trademark space . . . is both unwarranted and 
unwise [and] brings us perilously close to conceding that ownership of 
a trademark gives one the exclusive right to use the word on the 
Internet.”108 It is important for courts to take care to protect speech 
rights on the Internet and to prevent trademark owners from 
monopolizing domain names that should be available to honest, good-
faith users. 
2. Lack of Contextual Clues.  On the Internet, goods or services 
with the same or similar names may compete side-by-side without any 
hints in their domain names that they are in vastly different industries 
or geographic areas. For example, a user searching for a used 
Mercury automobile may enter “Mercury” into a search engine and 
 105. See, e.g., My Site Isn’t Doing Well in Search, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/support/
webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=34444 (last updated Aug. 16, 2011) (listing potential reasons 
for a website’s poor visibility in search-engine results). 
 106. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 682 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In Panavision, we 
stated that ‘[a] significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity that owns the web 
site,’ and we explained in [Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002),] that a 
source identifier is not entitled to full First Amendment protection.” (first alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)). 
 107. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319 (“Panavision attempted to register a web site on the 
Internet with the domain name Panavision.com. It could not do that, however, because 
Toeppen had already established a web site using Panavision’s trademark as his domain name. 
Toeppen’s web page for this site displayed photographs of the City of Pana, Illinois.”). 
 108. Litman, supra note 68, at 149. 
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get results ranging from the planet to the element to the 
programming language. A user may type in “mercury.com” expecting 
to find the automobile website, only to find an unrelated company’s 
website instead.109 
This issue is particularly problematic for competing trademarks 
that previously coexisted comfortably thanks to geographic distance. 
Even within the United States, two companies with the same name 
may have operated in separate states with little or no consumer 
confusion for years. With the dawn of the Internet, however, these 
two companies were suddenly forced to compete for their name’s one 
“trademark.com” domain name. As the Ninth Circuit stated in 2000, 
“Whereas in the world of bricks and mortar, one may be able to 
distinguish easily between an expensive restaurant in New York and a 
mediocre one in Los Angeles, the Web is a very different world.”110 
This difficulty with similarly named businesses’ appearing side-by-
side online suggests that context beyond domain names, such as 
website content and search-engine snippets, serves an important role 
in allaying consumer confusion. 
C. Options for Domain-Name Trademark Actions 
As the Internet gained prominence, conflicts began to arise 
between trademark owners and registrants of domain names 
containing trademarked terms.111 Beginning in the 1990s, U.S. 
trademark owners began to bring actions against domain-name 
registrants in traditional trademark-infringement actions under 
sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act.112 Section 32 allows suits 
against any unauthorized “use in commerce . . . of a registered mark 
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which 
 109. As of September 5, 2011, the domain name Mercury.com redirected to a Hewlett-
Packard product website. Enterprise Software, HP, http://www8.hp.com/us/en/software/
enterprise-software.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
 110. GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation 
omitted). 
 111. GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 79, at 767. 
 112. Blossom Lefcourt, The Prosecution of Cybergripers Under the Lanham Act, 3 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 269, 274 (2004); Mindy P. Fox, Note, Does It Really 
Suck?: The Impact of Cutting-Edge Marketing Tactics on Internet Trademark Law and Gripe Site 
Domain Name Disputes, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 225, 234 (2009); 
Rebecca S. Sorgen, Comment, Trademark Confronts Free Speech on the Information 
Superhighway: “Cybergripers” Face a Constitutional Collision, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 115, 
118–19 (2001). 
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such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive.”113 Section 43(a), a kind of federal unfair-competition law for 
registered and unregistered marks, allows suits against unauthorized 
“uses in commerce . . . likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities.”114 
To assess whether a likelihood of confusion exists for a 
traditional section 32 action, federal courts apply various multifactor 
tests that have been developed in the circuit courts.115 These tests 
often include nonexhaustive lists of factors relevant to the likelihood 
of consumer confusion.116 A defendant domain-name registrant’s bad-
faith intent is no longer required, but it remains a factor in these 
tests.117 These factors may apply differently, however, when the 
trademark is used to refer to the plaintiff trademark owner’s product 
or service, rather than to the defendant domain-name registrant’s 
own product or service. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, a three-
factor nominative-fair-use test replaces the traditional likelihood-of-
confusion test in these cases.118 The three factors are described as 
follows: 
First, the plaintiff’s product or service in question must be one not 
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so 
much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary 
to identify the plaintiff’s product or service; and third, the user must 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006). 
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 115. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:1 (“The test used is not identical 
throughout the various federal circuits. Most such tests have about eight factors to consider and 
the number of factors varies slightly among the 13 federal circuits.”). 
 116. Compare Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(stating that the Second Circuit considers “the strength of [the prior owner’s] mark, the degree 
of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior 
owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in 
adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the 
buyers”), with AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that 
the Ninth Circuit considers the “1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity 
of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and 
the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. defendant’s intent in selecting the 
mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines”). 
 117. See AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 348–49 (stating that the “defendant’s intent in selecting the 
mark” is a factor in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion between related 
goods). 
 118. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.119 
This test may apply to domain names that purposely reference a 
plaintiff’s trademark without authorization, such as fan site 
“harrypotterfans.com”120 or “gripe” site “harrypotterhaters.com.”121 
Some federal courts have also expanded trademark-dilution law 
to prohibit cybersquatting, in addition to blurring and tarnishment.122 
A cybersquatter is a person “who knowingly reserves with a [network 
information center] a domain name consisting of the mark or name of 
a company for the purpose of relinquishing the right to that domain 
name back to the legitimate owner for a price.”123 Federal dilution 
law, however, does not address all cybersquatter concerns, as it 
applies only to commercial uses of nationally famous trademarks.124 
In response to continued cybersquatting complaints, Congress 
enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)125 
in 1999.126 This act likely eliminated future applications of trademark-
dilution law to cybersquatting claims.127 A court may inquire into an 
ACPA claim regardless of whether trademark infringement exists 
under the Lanham Act.128 The ACPA prohibits “the act of registering, 
with the bad faith intent to profit, a domain name that is confusingly 
 119. Id. (quoting Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 120. HARRYPOTTERFANS.COM, http://www.harrypotterfans.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) 
(hosting a website for fans of the Harry Potter book and film series). 
 121. HARRYPOTTERHATERS.COM, http://www.harrypotterhaters.com (last visited Sept. 5, 
2011) (hosting a gripe site for critics of the Harry Potter book and film series). 
 122. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:67 (noting that, in addition to traditional dilution 
by blurring and tarnishment, “[s]ome case law decided prior to enactment in 1999 of the Anti-
Cybersquatting Protection Act added a short-lived third type of dilution: ‘cybersquatting’”). 
 123. Id. § 25:77. 
 124. See Sorgen, supra note 112, at 119 (“[Dilution] requirements became more difficult to 
meet in the realm of cybersquatting, especially where the public did not know the mark well 
enough to consider it famous, or where the cybersquatter simply registered the name without 
any commercial use.”). 
 125. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I, tit. III, 113 
Stat. 1501, 1501A–545 to –552 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 126. GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 79, at 768. 
 127. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:71; see also Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 
302 F.3d 248, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (“We may and do conclude that the enactment of the ACPA 
eliminated any need to force trademark-dilution law beyond its traditional bounds in order to 
fill a past hole, now otherwise plugged, in protection of trademark rights.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Bosley 
Medical’s cybersquatting claim is another matter [separate from its Lanham Act trademark-
infringement claim].”). 
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similar to a registered or unregistered mark or dilutive of a famous 
mark.”129 The ACPA’s “bad faith intent to profit” requirement 
creates a higher burden of proof for plaintiffs than do traditional 
trademark-infringement actions, and it considers a defendant’s own 
intellectual-property rights in the domain name.130 The ACPA 
specifically exempts defendants who “believed and had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or 
otherwise lawful.”131 If a defendant is found liable, however, a court 
can order the domain name’s forfeiture, cancellation, or transfer to 
the trademark owner, as well as statutory damages of up to 
$100,000.132 
At the same time that Congress enacted the ACPA, the newly 
formed ICANN approved its Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (UDRP).133 The UDRP is a “private, international, 
inexpensive, relatively fast, predominantly online dispute resolution 
 129. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 25:78. The Act also prohibits cybersquatting on a 
nontrademarked personal name. See id. § 25:80. 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006). The ACPA’s list of nonexhaustive enumerated 
factors include: 
(I) [T]he trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the 
domain name; (II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of 
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person; 
(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona 
fide offering of any goods or services; (IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or 
fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; (V) the person’s 
intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online location to a site accessible 
under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either 
for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a 
likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of 
the site; (VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name 
to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having 
an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, 
or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VII) the person’s 
provision of material and misleading false contact information when applying for the 
registration of the domain name, the person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate 
contact information, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such 
conduct; (VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names 
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that 
are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous 
marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, 
without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and (IX) the extent to which 
the mark incorporated in the person’s domain name registration is or is not distinctive 
and famous within the meaning of subsection (c) [of this section]. 
Id. 
 131. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(d), 1125(d)(1)(C). 
 133. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/
udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (providing the policy as approved by 
ICANN on October 24, 1999). 
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procedure for situations where a complainant is disputing the 
registration of a domain name.”134 Its low cost and ease of use make it 
an attractive option for complainants seeking domain-name transfer 
without damages.135 To succeed in a UDRP action, complainants must 
prove the following three elements: 
(i) [The respondent’s] domain name is identical or confusingly 
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has 
rights; and (ii) [respondent] ha[s] no rights or legitimate interests in 
respect of the domain name; and (iii) [the respondent’s] domain 
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.136 
To determine whether a respondent registered and used the domain 
name in bad faith, the UDRP lists nonexhaustive factors similar to 
those listed in the ACPA.137 Also like the ACPA, the UDRP exempts 
certain fair uses of domain names.138 
 134. Fox, supra note 112, at 239. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 133, § 4(a)(i–iii). 
 137. Compare id. § 4(b) (“(i) [C]ircumstances indicating that [respondent] ha[s] registered 
or [respondent] ha[s] acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or 
otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the 
trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in 
excess of [respondent’s] documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; 
or (ii) [respondent] ha[s] registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the 
trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided 
that [respondent] ha[s] engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or (iii) [respondent] ha[s] 
registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a 
competitor; or (iv) by using the domain name, [respondent] ha[s] intentionally attempted to 
attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to [respondent’s] web site or other on-line location, 
by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, 
affiliation, or endorsement of [respondent’s] web site or location or of a product or service on 
[respondent’s] web site or location.”), with supra note 130 (listing the ACPA’s nonexhaustive 
bad-faith factors). 
 138. See ICANN, supra note 133, § 4(c) (“(i) [B]efore any notice to [respondent] of the 
dispute, [respondent’s] use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name 
corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; 
or (ii) [respondent] (as an individual, business, or other organization) ha[s] been commonly 
known by the domain name, even if [respondent] ha[s] acquired no trademark or service mark 
rights; or (iii) [respondent is] making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain 
name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the 
trademark or service mark at issue.”). 
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D. A Chilling Effect on Trademarks in Domain Names 
Despite these trademark-action options for domain-name cases, 
uncertainty continues to prevail.139 As a result, trademark owners 
“typically fire off [cease-and-desist letters] even when the 
complained-of expressive uses are almost certainly legal under the 
substance of current doctrine.”140 These letters are sometimes sent to 
registrants whose domain names would likely not be found to infringe 
the complaining party’s trademark in an actual lawsuit. Cease-and-
desist letters ask the domain-name registrants to immediately “cease” 
operation of their websites and may ask for surrender of the domain 
names.141 Accused domain-name registrants may not be able to afford 
legal help, and thus they may not know how to respond to cease-and-
desist letters. Fearful of the litigation threats contained in these 
letters, the registrants may simply follow the letters’ instructions and 
transfer the domain names.142 
Even if the accused infringers have legal aid, the unclear state of 
the law and the financial costs of litigation leave them without clear 
options. Maintaining their domain names could lead to litigation, and 
it could hurt a registrant’s case if the trademark owner shows that the 
registrant kept the domain name after receipt of a cease-and-desist 
letter. Moreover, even if the registrant believes it has a strong 
argument for retaining the domain name, it may not have the 
resources to enter litigation with the trademark owner. This “lethal 
combination of uncertain standards with lengthy and costly litigation 
creates a classic chilling effect upon the unlicensed use of trademarks 
to facilitate speech, even when such uses are perfectly lawful.”143 This 
 139. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 140. McGeveran, supra note 9, at 64. 
 141. See, e.g., What To Expect When You’re Expecting To Be Sued for Infringement, 
CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/faq.cgi (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) 
(listing common requests in cease-and-desist letters, including ceasing to use the mark and 
surrendering the domain name). 
 142. One small business owner posted his comments publicly, describing a small business 
that, “[n]ot surprisingly, . . . couldn’t afford to fight back, so like most small businesses attacked 
by a trademark bully, it was forced to give in to [a trademark owner’s] ludicrous claims and 
demands.” Scott Smith, Request for Comments: Trademark Litigation Tactics, BIZSTARZ (Jan. 
7, 2011), http://dl.dropbox.com/u/1727856/Trademark_Bullies_Scott_Smith.pdf (also describing 
the author’s own thirteen-year battle with a trademark owner, which cost him an estimated 
$30,000,000 or more in lost business, legal fees, and associated costs). Although the alleged 
infringement in these cases does not always take place online, the Internet facilitates trademark 
owners’ easy and low-cost discovery of small businesses with the same or similar names. 
 143. McGeveran, supra note 9, at 53. 
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chilling effect could cause website owners to avoid registration or to 
quickly surrender domain names that contain any trademarked terms, 
despite their potential legality. A predictable framework to approach 
these cases consistently, with a clear presumption either for or against 
infringement, would help clarify the law and avoid this chilling effect. 
III.  AN UPDATED FRAMEWORK: SENSIBLE AGNOSTICISM 
As courts struggle with domain-name cases, it is important that 
they remain focused on the historical purposes of trademark law 
while also recognizing the increasing competency of Internet 
consumers. Fundamentally, courts facing trademark-law actions 
should aim to promote accuracy in the marketplace. This goal 
necessarily includes rooting out falsities and deception while also 
allowing fair uses of terms that accurately describe goods or products. 
Courts should remain committed to promoting fair competition and 
to protecting both competitors and consumers. Bad-faith intent 
should be an important factor in the analysis. 
Although courts should remain focused on trademark law’s 
purposes, they should also keep abreast of the evolving nature of 
Internet use. Consumer behavior online has evolved as the Internet 
has become more sophisticated and more widely used.144 American 
consumers increasingly turn to the Internet for goods and services, 
setting new online-shopping records year after year.145 Internet 
consumers shop online for a variety of goods and services, from 
movies to groceries.146 American Internet users turn to search engines 
 144. See, e.g., Cameron Meierhoefer, Changes in the Search Landscape and How They 
Impact Search Measurement, COMSCORE VOICES (June 10, 2010), http://blog.comscore.com/
2010/06/changes_in_search_landscape.html (“Since [July 2007], we’ve seen a wave of change 
across the web that has changed the very nature of a web page, from an object that is requested 
and delivered, to one that is a live platform that can integrate content from many sources. And 
search has changed along with it . . . .”). 
 145. See, e.g., Press Release, comScore, Inc., Billion Dollar Bonanza: Cyber Monday 
Surpasses $1 Billion in U.S. Spending as Heaviest Online Shopping Day in History (Dec. 1, 
2010), available at http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/12/Billion_
Dollar_Bonanza_Cyber_Monday_Surpasses_1_Billion_in_U.S._Spending (describing Cyber 
Monday 2010’s record-breaking online sales); Press Release, comScore, Inc., Final Pre-
Christmas Push Propels U.S. Online Holiday Season Spending Through December 26 to Record 
$30.8 Billion (Dec. 29, 2010), available at http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_
Releases/2010/12/Final_Pre_Christmas_Push_Propels_U.S._Online_Holiday_Season_Spending 
(describing the 2010 holiday season’s record-breaking online sales). 
 146. See, e.g., NETFLIX, http://www.netflix.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (streaming and 
mailing movies to consumers based on transactions completed on its website); PEAPOD, http://
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to locate websites, as evidenced by their 18.4 billion searches in 
October 2010 alone.147 
In domain-name trademark actions, courts should not rely on 
outdated analyses from precedent if those analyses are based on 
consumer behavior that has since changed. The Internet users of 2010 
utilized search engines at prolific rates and would probably have 
disagreed with Panavision’s statement twelve years earlier that “there 
is nothing equivalent to a phone book or directory assistance for the 
Internet.”148 Some users may still type in a “trademark.com” domain 
name as a first try to locate a trademark owner’s website. But those 
Internet users also have many other, perhaps preferable, options: 
typing in a URL remembered from a previous visit, a conversation 
with a friend, or an advertisement; clicking on a link; clicking on an 
item in the user’s web-browser history or bookmarks folders; or 
performing a search on a search engine.149 
The Ninth Circuit’s 2010 domain-name trademark case Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari abandoned older frameworks like 
the one in Panavision to offer an updated framework for analyzing 
these cases.150 Understanding that case, its sensible agnosticism 
theory, and its four categories of domain-name trademark use is vital 
to understanding the Ninth Circuit’s new framework. It is also 
important to consider criticisms and challenges of this new approach 
before applying it to future cases. This Part first discusses the Ninth 
Circuit’s examination of the lower court’s errors and its presentation 
of a sensible agnosticism theory before suggesting the challenges this 
theory may face. 
www.peapod.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (delivering groceries to consumers through an 
Internet order service). 
 147. See, e.g., Press Release, comScore, Inc., comScore Releases October 2010 U.S. Search 
Engine Rankings (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/
Press_Releases/2010/11/comScore_Releases_October_2010_U.S._Search_Engine_Rankings 
(“Americans conducted 18.4 billion total core search queries in October with Google Sites 
leading with 11.8 billion searches, followed by Yahoo! Sites with 3.4 billion and Microsoft Sites 
with 2.2 billion.”). 
 148. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 149. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in 
the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 208 n.249 (1998) (“In addition to 
search engines and directories, one can connect to a destination by manually entering an 
address delivered by another medium (mass media advertisement, word of mouth, consumer 
product label, etc.), reusing a ‘bookmark’ saved by browser software, or following a link from a 
non-directory Web page.”). 
 150. See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(describing a new framework for interpreting domain-name trademark actions). 
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A. Tabari: The District Court’s Errors 
In Tabari, the district court examined the Tabaris’ auto-broker 
website and its domain names, “buy-a-lexus.com” and 
“buyorleaselexus.com.”151 The court applied the usual likelihood-of-
confusion factors and found that the Tabaris had infringed Toyota’s 
“Lexus” trademark.152 The district court then issued a broad 
injunction, barring the Tabaris from the use the word “Lexus” in any 
domain name, service mark, trademark, trade name, metatag, or 
other commercial indication of origin.153 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and 
remanded the case, stating that the Tabaris were allowed to use the 
“Lexus” trademark as part of their domain names.154 Chief Judge 
Alex Kozinski explained in the majority opinion that the district court 
had incorrectly applied the Ninth Circuit’s nominative-fair-use 
doctrine, issued an overly broad injunction, and failed to take into 
account the Tabaris’ intent. 
1. Application of the Nominative-Fair-Use Doctrine.  First, as 
Chief Judge Kozinski explained, the district court erred by 
misapplying the Ninth Circuit’s nominative-fair-use analysis.155 When 
a defendant uses a trademark to reference the trademark owner’s 
actual product or service, the Ninth Circuit analyzes the defendant’s 
conduct under a nominative-fair-use analysis.156 This analysis is an 
alternative to the standard likelihood-of-confusion test, and as 
Professor McCarthy notes, it “should be applied in the same manner” 
as the likelihood-of-confusion test.157 In Tabari, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the district court had erred by applying the traditional likelihood-
of-confusion factors and then treating nominative use as an 
affirmative defense.158 Instead, the Ninth Circuit explained that the 
nominative-fair-use analysis should have replaced these traditional 
 151. Id. at 1175. For a brief synopsis of the case’s facts, see supra text accompanying notes 
1–6. 
 152. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1175 (describing the lower court’s application of the Ninth Circuit’s 
eight likelihood-of-confusion factors). 
 153. Id. at 1176. 
 154. Id. at 1182. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text. 
 157. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:11. In fact, “[o]ther circuits have reached similar 
results by use of their general multi-purpose list of factors.” Id. 
 158. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1182. 
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factors and then concluded that “Toyota must bear the burden of 
establishing that the Tabaris’ use of the Lexus mark was not 
nominative fair use.”159 
The Tabaris’ use of the term “Lexus” in their domain names was 
not the type of inaccurate, misleading appropriation that trademark 
law historically prohibited.160 Their domain names did not create a 
false association between a non-Lexus product and a Lexus product. 
Instead, the domain names accurately described Lexus products.161 
The Tabaris invited viewers to “buy a Lexus” or “buy or lease Lexus” 
vehicles by becoming their customers.162 Here, the Tabaris used 
“Lexus” to reference Toyota’s vehicles—“when they say Lexus, they 
mean Lexus”—and thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, the case 
required a nominative-fair-use analysis.163 The only potential risk for 
Toyota was that the domain name might have confused consumers 
into thinking that Lexus sponsored or endorsed the Tabaris’ website 
or their services, rather than simply produced the goods that the 
Tabaris sold.164 Thus, the Tabaris used the term “Toyota” in a 
nominative way, and the district court incorrectly employed the 
nominative-fair-use test. 
2. The Danger of Broad Injunctions.  After using the incorrect 
analysis to support its finding of infringement, the district court 
enjoined the Tabaris from using the term “Lexus” in a domain name 
or any other commercial indication of origin.165 The Ninth Circuit 
criticized this broad injunction.166 The injunction prevented the 
Tabaris from conveying accurate information about their business—
specifically, that they helped consumers purchase actual Lexus 
vehicles. 
The district court’s injunction greatly restricted the Tabaris’ use 
of the term “Lexus” and, echoing Professor Litman’s fears, came 
“perilously close to conceding that ownership of a trademark gives 
 159. Id. 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 14–36. 
 161. See Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1182 (holding the “Tabaris’ use of the Lexus mark” to be fair). 
 162. Id. at 1181. 
 163. Id. at 1175. 
 164. See id. (arguing that the disclaimer eliminated any risk that consumers would think that 
Lexus sponsored or endorsed the Tabaris’ website). 
 165. Id. at 1176. 
 166. Id. 
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one the exclusive right to use the word on the Internet.”167 The Ninth 
Circuit criticized the overbreadth of the district court’s decision, 
explaining that “[a] trademark injunction, particularly one involving 
nominative fair use, can raise serious First Amendment concerns 
because it can interfere with truthful communication between buyers 
and sellers in the marketplace.”168 
3. Plaintiff’s Intent and the Purpose of Trademark Law.  
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted the tension between the 
Tabaris’ case and the purposes of trademark law. The court found 
that Toyota did not “claim the business of brokering Lexus cars is 
illegal or that it has contracted with its dealers to prohibit selling 
through a broker. Instead, Toyota is using this trademark lawsuit to 
make it more difficult for consumers to use the Tabaris to buy a 
Lexus.”169 Toyota’s efforts to stifle communication between 
consumers and its competitor, an independent auto broker, thus 
conflicted with the purposes of unfair-competition law.170 The Ninth 
Circuit stated outright that “[p]rohibition of such truthful and non-
misleading speech does not advance the Lanham Act’s purpose of 
protecting consumers and preventing unfair competition; in fact, it 
undermines that rationale by frustrating honest communication 
between the Tabaris and their customers.”171 The Ninth Circuit thus 
focused on trademark law’s protection of accurate communication 
between sellers and consumers and vacated the lower court’s 
injunction. 
B. The Tabari Theory: Sensible Agnosticism 
Instead of merely remanding the case based on the lower court’s 
errors, Chief Judge Kozinski used the opportunity to elaborate upon 
his thoroughly updated approach to trademark actions involving 
domain names. As noted in a recent Trademark Reporter article, this 
analysis was a real “departure from previous domain name 
 167. See Litman, supra note 68, at 149 (describing a trend in which trademark owners have 
been empowered to seize domain names from others who have already registered them); see 
also supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 168. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1176. 
 169. Id. at 1175. 
 170. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 171. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1176–77. 
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cases . . . .”172 Although one judge on the panel wrote a concurrence 
that dissented from some of the majority’s dicta,173 commentators 
have declared that “[t]here is no doubt that this case, particularly the 
dicta in the majority opinion, will affect domain-name disputes 
brought under both the ACPA and the UDRP in the coming year.”174 
This Section describes the court’s updated description of consumer 
behavior in the unique Internet milieu and the four new categories of 
domain names containing trademarks discussed by the court. 
1. A Focus on the Online Marketplace.  Critically, when 
conducting its nominative-fair-use analysis, the Ninth Circuit tailored 
its test to fit the online environment, holding that the “focus must be 
on the ‘reasonably prudent consumer’ in the marketplace.”175 The 
court then defined the terms of this test, explaining that “[t]he 
relevant marketplace is the online marketplace, and the relevant 
consumer is a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping 
online; the kind of consumer who is likely to visit the Tabaris’ website 
when shopping for an expensive product like a luxury car.”176 The 
court explicitly noted that “[u]nreasonable, imprudent and 
inexperienced web-shoppers are not relevant.”177 
As the court concluded, the relevant reasonable, prudent, and 
experienced web-shoppers would not be confused as to Lexus’s 
sponsorship or endorsement of the Tabaris’ site.178 The court’s 
language does not suggest that all online shoppers are highly 
educated urbanites with outstanding intellects. Instead, the court 
simply describes the required level of sophistication and 
understanding of users who spend time online, use the Internet for 
shopping, and understand how to purchase items online. This 
relevant-consumer concept reflects the fact that “[t]rademark law was 
not meant to protect the most unsophisticated or least intelligent 
consumers, but instead to evaluate whether a reasonably prudent 
 172. Peter M. Brody & Alexandra J. Roberts, What’s in a Domain Name? Nominative Fair 
Use Online After Toyota v. Tabari, 100 TRADEMARK REP. 1290, 1330 (2010). 
 173. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1185–86. 
 174. Paul Godfread & Kristine Dorrain, Report, Developments in Domain Names, 66 BUS. 
LAW. 221, 226 (2010). 
 175. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1176. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1182. 
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potential purchaser would be confused.”179 This reasoning in fact 
mirrors a non-Internet trademark case from 1947, when Judge (later 
Supreme Court Justice) Minton exclaimed, “[W]e cannot believe that 
anyone whose I. Q. is high enough to be regarded by the law would 
ever be confused or would be likely to be confused . . . .”180 
Knowingly or not, Chief Judge Kozinski revived this disregard 
for inept consumers with his theory of sensible agnosticism.181 
Panavision’s concern for easily confused web surfers may indeed have 
been appropriate for the very earliest Internet users.182 It is no longer 
necessary or appropriate, however, to coddle Internet shoppers out of 
a paternalistic concern for the few inept consumers who may stumble 
upon a website and find it confusing.183 
The majority explained that the Tabaris’ relevant consumers 
might, at worst, face potential uncertainty that would be unlikely to 
amount to actionable harm on its own. Instead of confusion, “the 
worst that can happen [in these cases] is that some consumers may 
arrive at the site uncertain as to what they will find.”184 This 
uncertainty would not amount to actionable confusion because “in 
the age of FIOS, cable modems, DSL and T1 lines, reasonable, 
prudent and experienced internet consumers are accustomed to such 
exploration by trial and error.”185 The court described the relevant 
Internet consumers as “skip[ping] from site to site, ready to hit the 
back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents.”186 
These experienced Internet users “fully expect to find some sites that 
aren’t what they imagine based on a glance at the domain name or 
search engine summary.”187 In fact, the court explained that online 
shoppers “don’t start out by typing random URLs containing 
trademarked words hoping to get a lucky hit. They may start out by 
typing trademark.com, but then they’ll rely on a search engine or 
word of mouth.”188 This “word of mouth” includes “spoken 
 179. Rothman, supra note 104, at 171–72. 
 180. Cal. Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971, 973–74 (7th Cir. 1947). 
 181. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1179. 
 182. See supra notes 93–106 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1176 (dismissing the district court’s concerns about protecting 
inexperienced web shoppers). 
 184. Id. at 1179. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1178. 
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recommendations from friends and acquaintances,” as well as “online 
shoppers, including chat rooms, discussion forums, feedback and 
evaluation websites, and the like.”189 
Although Chief Judge Kozinski did not support these statements 
with empirical studies or expert opinions, they appear consistent with 
the assessments of other commentators.190 Notably, Professor Jennifer 
E. Rothman’s work similarly asserts that “[t]here is no doubt that 
reasonably prudent Internet shoppers will be aware [of] and prepared 
for the possibility that their guess of a domain name will send them to 
the wrong location.”191 Essentially, the relevant Internet consumer is 
not confused by momentarily visiting the incorrect site and is able to 
remedy the situation in mere seconds.192 
The Tabari majority next articulated the effects of this user 
behavior on consumer expectations: 
Outside the special case of trademark.com, or domains that actively 
claim affiliation with the trademark holder, consumers don’t form 
any firm expectations about the sponsorship of a website until 
they’ve seen the landing page—if then. This is sensible agnosticism, 
not consumer confusion. So long as the site as a whole does not 
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder, such 
momentary uncertainty does not preclude a finding of nominative 
fair use.193 
A certain domain name may indeed cause a likelihood of confusion, 
but it is the exception, or “special case,” not the rule.194 Most 
nominative trademark uses outside of those exceptions are unlikely to 
cause a likelihood of consumer confusion because the consumers 
never form “firm expectations” that can later be confused.195 
Contextual information likely shapes consumer expectations 
more than the terms in a domain name.196 Users learning of domain 
names through word of mouth likely have additional information 
 189. Id. at 1178 n.6. 
 190. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 104, at 172; infra notes 236–237 and accompanying text. 
 191. Rothman, supra note 104, at 172. 
 192. See id. (“Courts have . . . greatly exaggerated the burdens of being led to a different 
website. Unlike in the brick and mortar world where one may have gone a substantial distance 
to get to a particular store, websurfers can quickly, in a matter of seconds, redirect their web 
browser away from the incorrect site.”). 
 193. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1179 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1178. 
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about the site that affects their decision to visit it.197 An 
advertisement’s promise of a discount or a friend’s description of a 
humor site likely influence the user’s decision more than the terms in 
the domain name. Users accessing sites through a search engine, 
meanwhile, “will click on the link for a likely-relevant site without 
paying much attention to the URL.”198 Thus, if confusion results, it is 
likely a result of the search engine’s ranking algorithm, not any 
specific term in the domain name.199 Further, search-engine-result 
pages provide textual snippets from the site and enhanced previews 
that give users additional information before they click on any link.200 
These features further reduce the possibility that any confusion 
results from the domain name alone. 
Moreover, consumer recognition of “trademark.com” domain 
names as the official websites of trademark owners may in fact 
support the Tabaris’ use of their domain names.201 The amount of 
effort that has gone into assigning “trademark.com” domain names to 
trademark owners, as shown by the ACPA and UDRP,202 suggests 
that consumers may expect to find a well-known trademark owner’s 
official site at “trademark.com.”203 The Tabari court again 
emphasized the sophistication of customers relevant to t
Consumers who use the internet for shopping are generally quite 
sophisticated about such matters and won’t be fooled into thinking 
that the prestigious German car manufacturer sells boots at 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. at 1178–79 (“Use of a trademark in the site’s domain name isn’t materially 
different from use in its text or metatags in this context; a search engine can find a trademark in 
a site regardless of where exactly it appears.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Google Instant Previews, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/landing/instant
previews (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (“Instant Previews show you a visual preview of your search 
results . . . . Text call outs highlight where your search term appears on the web page so you can 
evaluate if it’s what you’re looking for.”); Jennifer Van Grove, Google This: 5 Reasons To 
Switch to Bing, MASHABLE (Sept. 19, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/09/19/bing-extras 
(“Every time you search you should notice a little orange dot next to an individual result. 
Mouse over that to view a ‘More on this page’ preview of content, and save yourself the 
headache of a disappointing dead end.”). 
 201. See Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1178 (“The importance ascribed to trademark.com in fact 
suggests that far less confusion will result when a domain making nominative use of a trademark 
includes characters in addition to those making up the mark.”). 
 202. See supra notes 126–138 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1178 (“If customers type in trademark.com and find the site 
occupied by someone other than the trademark holder, they may well believe it is the trademark 
holder, despite contrary evidence on the website itself.”). 
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mercedesboots.com, or homes at mercedeshomes.com, or that 
comcastsucks.org is sponsored or endorsed by the TV cable 
company just because the string of letters making up its trademark 
appears in the domain.204 
In this case, “[b]ecause the official Lexus site is almost certain to be 
found at lexus.com (as, in fact, it is), it’s far less likely to be found at 
other sites containing the word Lexus.”205 Relevant Internet 
consumers would in fact be skeptical if told that Lexus’s official 
domain name was “buy-a-lexus.com.” The relevant consumers 
targeted by the Tabaris with their websites are not, in fact, easily 
confused by these types of domain names. Thus, the Tabaris’ 
nominative trademark use in their domain names, with no active 
suggestion of sponsorship or endorsement, did not amount to 
infringement.206 
3. The Tabari Categories: Four Domain-Name Trademark Uses.  
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion considered all possible uses of 
trademarks in domain names and divined four general categories of 
use. This “surprisingly lucid taxonomy” provides a useful, bright-line 
guide for future cases in this area.207 The three “special case[s]” that 
carry a presumption of infringement include “trademark.com” 
domain names, domain names with only slight modifications, and 
domain names with affirmative suggestions.208 The fourth category 
covers all other nominative trademark uses in domain names and 
carries no presumption of infringement. 
a. Trademarks as SLDs: “Trademark.com.”  If an entire SLD 
consists of a trademark alone, the Tabari majority concluded that “it 
will typically suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark 
holder.”209 Although this type of SLD “typically” raises a presumption 
against use, the court carefully noted that not all “trademark.com” 
domain names are likely to cause consumer confusion.210 If, however, 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 1182. 
 207. Goldman, supra note 8. 
 208. See Goldman, supra note 8 (“To segregate legitimate from illegitimate uses of third 
party trademarks in domain names, the opinion lays out a surprisingly lucid taxonomy with 3 
categories of presumptively illegitimate domain names . . . .”). 
 209. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1177. 
 210. Id. at 1177 n.4. 
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a “trademark.com” site is selling goods or services that are related to 
the trademark at issue, the court explained that the “trademark.com 
domain . . . will not generally be nominative fair use,” as the 
affirmative suggestion of sponsorship or endorsement generally 
precludes nominative fair use.211 
Despite this favorable presumption, trademark-infringement 
actions under the Lanham Act may not be the best choice for 
trademark owners. Instead, they should primarily pursue 
cybersquatting actions under the ACPA or UDRP when dealing with 
“trademark.com” domain names.212 Under the ACPA and UDRP, 
trademark owners must “prov[e] the rigorous elements of cyber-
squatting,”213 but they can then achieve transfer or surrender of a 
domain name.214 In contrast, under the Lanham Act, “the proper 
remedy for infringing use of a mark on a site generally falls short of 
entirely prohibiting use of the site’s domain name.”215 If a trademark 
owner nevertheless pursues a trademark-infringement claim under 
the Lanham Act for a “trademark.com” domain name, there will be a 
presumption of infringement.216 
b. Slight Modifications to Trademark SLDs: “Trademark-
usa.com.”  Next, the Ninth Circuit determined that slight 
modifications to trademark SLDs “like trademark-USA.com, 
trademark-of-glendale.com or e-trademark.com will also generally 
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder . . . .”217 
The court explained that these are modifications that consumers have 
come to expect from official trademark owners.218 An “e-” preceding 
“trademark.com” “merely indicates the electronic version of a 
brand,” and any location modifier “indicates that consumers can 
expect to find the brand’s local subsidiary, franchise or affiliate.”219 
For example, the Pandora jewelry company’s Mall of America store 
operates the domain name “pandoraMOA.com.”220 Given their 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1182. 
 213. Id. 
 214. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C) (2006). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1177–78. 
 217. Id. at 1179. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. PANDORA, http://www.pandoramoa.com, supra note 90. 
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suggestion of sponsorship or endorsement, these domain names will 
also raise a presumption of infringement when registered without 
trademark-owner authorization.221 
c. Affirmative Suggestions in SLDs: “Official-Trademark-
Site.com.”  The court further held that domain names’ affirmative 
suggestions of sponsorship or endorsement by a trademark owner, 
such as “official-trademark-site.com or we-are-trademark.com,” are 
also likely to lead to confusion about sponsorship or endorsement.222 
If the trademark owner has not authorized the website, a domain 
name’s explicit assertion to the contrary may mislead even the 
relevant savvy Internet consumer, and thus the court stated that this 
type of use is “not nominative fair use.”223 
d. Nominative Trademark Use in SLDs: “Trademark-
Forum.com.”  Unlike the previous three “special case” trademark 
uses, the Ninth Circuit appeared to approve of most remaining 
nominative trademark uses in SLDs. Users do not have “firm 
expectations” that trademark owners operate these sites, the court 
reasoned, because 
a number of sites make nominative use of trademarks in their 
domains but are not sponsored or endorsed by the trademark 
holder: You can preen about your Mercedes at mercedesforum.com 
and mercedestalk.net, read the latest about your double-skim-no-
whip latte at starbucksgossip.com and find out what goodies the 
world’s greatest electronics store has on sale this week at 
fryselectronics-ads.com.224 
The court also listed “mercedesboots.com,” “mercedeshomes.com,” 
and “comcastsucks.org” as nominative uses of trademarked terms.225 
As Tabari’s holding indicated, “buy-a-TRADEMARK.com and 
 221. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1179. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1178. 
 225. Id. This category would also likely include the URL “WTForever21.com,” a blog that 
comments on fashion garments made by the clothing store Forever 21. WTFOREVER 21, http://
wtforever21.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). In April 2011, Forever 21 sent the blogger a cease-
and-desist letter threatening to sue for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, unfair 
competition, and dilution. Jenna Sauers, Forever 21 Sues Fashion Blogger, JEZEBEL (June 6, 
2011, 4:10 PM), http://jezebel.com/5809063/forever-21-sues-fashion-blogger. 
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buyorleaseTRADEMARK.com should be fair game for resellers and 
related parties like buying agents.”226 
4. The Lessons of Tabari’s Sensible Agnosticism.  Earlier courts 
grappling with trademark use on the Internet adopted protectionist 
views that infantilized consumers.227 In 1997, the Ninth Circuit 
described an inept consumer baffled by search engines in Panavision 
International L.P. v. Toeppen.228 Thirteen years later, Tabari enriched 
the dialogue with its updated description of today’s more 
sophisticated online consumer. The case moved away from the more 
protectionist stance that sought to eliminate confusion among the 
most inept consumers, instead focusing on the relevant, sophisticated 
consumer. In particular, it focused on the relevant consumer for the 
facts of the case—a consumer looking on the Internet for information 
about a high-price purchase. Tabari promoted trademark law’s 
historical values by protecting a business’s right to communicate fairly 
and accurately with potential customers. This approach raises the bar 
for the consumer-confusion test, preventing plaintiffs from prevailing 
when their confusion claims are based on inept consumers. Tabari’s 
approach—sensible agnosticism—presents a useful approach for 
today’s domain-name trademark cases. 
C. Challenges of this Framework 
As stated by Chief Judge Kozinski in Tabari’s majority opinion, 
the sensible agnosticism framework updates the language of domain-
name trademark cases by analyzing consumer expectations online.229 
Although this Note suggests that this framework should be applied to 
future cases in this category, it also recognizes the challenges that the 
framework may face. This Section analyzes the potential challenges 
 226. Goldman, supra note 8. In a footnote, the court conceded that even trademarks in this 
category that do not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner may be 
prohibited under a trademark-dilution theory. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1179 n.7. As an example, “the 
website People of Walmart, which publishes rude photos of Walmart shoppers at 
peopleofwalmart.com, might dilute the Walmart trademark by associating it with violations of 
customers’ privacy and the idea that a visitor to Walmart stores risks being photographed and 
ridiculed on the internet.” Id. Although the court did not mention this possibility, 
mercedesboots.com and mercedeshomes.com could also conceivably be subject to a dilution 
action under a theory of “blurring.” See Goldman, supra note 8 (“I wonder about dilution with 
these two.”). 
 227. See, e.g., supra notes 93–106 and accompanying text. 
 228. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 229. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1179. 
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and responses to Tabari’s precedential value, the framework’s need 
for empirical evidence, and its required contextual analysis. 
1. Precedential Value.  Within the Ninth Circuit, this case appears 
to possibly overturn precedent without overtly stating that it was 
doing so.230 The opinion also appears to dispose of issues that were 
previously unresolved.231 In other circuits, Tabari will lack 
precedential value, and courts may avoid the case entirely because of 
its use of the Ninth Circuit’s distinctive nominative-fair-use test. 
Although the nominative-fair-use analysis is important, Tabari’s 
analysis of trademarks in domain names is the framework that should 
be adopted in future cases—regardless of the specific nominative- or 
fair-use analysis used. As Professor McCarthy has noted, other courts 
“have for many years reached results consistent with those in the 
Ninth Circuit without using a separate ‘nominative fair use’ test.”232 
Based on its updated approach, Tabari could meaningfully change the 
discourse in the Ninth and other circuits in the way Panavision and 
similar cases did when domain-name trademark cases first arose. 
2. Need for Empirical Evidence.  One possible critique of Chief 
Judge Kozinski’s approach in Tabari is its lack of empirical evidence. 
For example, Kozinski did not cite any authorities when he described 
 230. Goldman, supra note 8 (“This is a rich and multi-faceted opinion written in a confident 
and emphatic style[—]perhaps too emphatically, as the opinion swings around like a bull in a 
china shop, breezily overturning or sidestepping numerous 9th Circuit precedents on both 
domain names and nominative use.”). 
 231. Id. (“The opinion says that an evaluation of consumer confusion is implicitly built into 
the [New Kids on the Block] nominative use test. Therefore, ‘if the nominative use satisfies the 
three-factor [New Kids] test, it doesn’t infringe’ without needing to consider the likelihood of 
consumer confusion test at all. Thus, ‘nominative fair use “replaces” [the Ninth Circuit’s 
traditional likelihood-of-confusion test] as the proper test for likely consumer confusion 
whenever defendant asserts to have referred to the trademarked good itself.’ Further, once a 
‘defendant seeking to assert nominative fair use as a defense . . . show[s] that it used the mark to 
refer to the trademarked good,’ the trademark owner bears the burden of disproving 
nominative use. All of these procedural points have been hotly contested in prior cases.” 
(omission and fourth alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1176, 
1182–83)). 
 232. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:11 (citing Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 
F.3d 211, 236 (3d Cir. 2005); Univ. of Fla. v. KPB, Inc., 89 F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 1996); Hormel 
Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 505 (2d Cir. 1996); G.D. Searle & Co. v. 
Hudson Pharm. Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1983); Trail Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 381 F.2d 353, 354 (5th Cir. 1967); Societe Comptoir de l’Industrie Cotonniere 
Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 36–37 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
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a typical online shopper’s behavior.233 This dearth of support spurred 
criticism that Kozinski “grounded much of [the] decision on factual 
assumptions regarding consumer perception of the domain names at 
issue and consumer Web-browsing behavior.”234 Professor Rebecca 
Tushnet points out this lack of empirical evidence and states that the 
Tabari “rule only works if courts are very confident of their ability to 
assess context and also very confident that consumer understandings 
of domain names remain static—as Kozinski evidently is.”235 
Despite this criticism, some commentators have also praised 
Chief Judge Kozinski’s “modern, Internet-saavy [sic] take on the use 
of trademarks in domain names.”236 Even Professor Tushnet notes her 
agreement with Kozinski’s description of online consumer behavior.237 
Instead of closing the door on this new approach, courts should use it 
as an opportunity to reevaluate their own treatment of online 
behavior. Courts should encourage parties to introduce empirical 
evidence in the courtroom in the form of consumer surveys or expert 
opinions.238 This empirical evidence will allow the doctrine to 
continue its maturation as online behavior 
3. Required Contextual Analysis.  Another challenge courts may 
face in applying Tabari is that its approach requires a contextual 
analysis of the facts. But Tabari does not provide bright-line rules on 
the context that may help courts decide whether a trademark 
 233. Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1178–79. 
 234. Christopher Dolan, IP: Nominative Fair Use and Domain Names, INSIDECOUNSEL 
(Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2010/10/12/nominative-fair-use-and-domain-
names; see also Goldman, supra note 8 (“[T]he opinion’s reasoning remains predicated on dicey 
assumptions about consumer search behavior . . . .”). 
 235. Rebecca Tushnet, Kozinski Takes Another Whack at Nominative Fair Use, REBECCA 
TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (July 8, 2010), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2010/07/kozinski-takes-
another-whack-at.html. 
 236. Ryan Gile, Ninth Circuit Gives Victory to Pro Se Defendants Fighting Against Toyota, 
LAS VEGAS TRADEMARK ATT’Y (July 13, 2010), http://www.vegastrademarkattorney.com/2010/
07/ninth-circuit-gives-victory-to-pro-se.html; see also Thomas O’Toole, Pro Se Litigants Secure 
Big Victory for Domain Owners in Ninth Circuit Trademark Ruling, BNA E-COM. & TECH L. 
BLOG (July 8, 2010), http://pblog.bna.com/techlaw/2010/07/pro-se-litigants-secure-big-victory-
for-domain-owners-in-ninth-circuit-trademark-ruling.html (“In just a few pages, Chief Judge 
Alex Kozinski’s opinion . . . described accurately how consumers use the Internet (an 
uncommon feat in judicial opinions).”). 
 237. Tushnet, supra note 235 (“I don’t think Kozinski is currently wrong about how 
consumers use domain names.”). 
 238. See Dolan, supra note 234 (“[T]rademark owners should consider consumer perception 
surveys and expert opinions regarding consumer behavior to help overcome any asserted 
nominative fair use defense.”). 
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infringement has occurred. Online users base their perceptions of a 
website on how a URL or link is presented to them and on what they 
see when they arrive at a website.239 For example, a website owner 
may manipulate search-engine algorithms so that a website’s search-
engine-result snippet reads “Sponsored by Toyota” or may use 
deceptive ad taglines like, “Toyota’s Official Site for Lexus 
Shoppers!” An owner may also place this language on a website and 
use Toyota’s official logo in such a way as to suggest official 
endorsement. On the other hand, a website may contain no official 
logos or hints at endorsement, and it may even contain a disclaimer 
explaining its lack of sponsorship or endorsement. In Tabari, the 
court recognized that having a website disclaimer helped the Tabaris 
prove their lack of infringement.240 The court was also careful to note, 
however, that “[s]peakers are under no obligation to provide a 
disclaimer as a condition for engaging in truthful, non-misleading 
speech.”241 Instead, “[w]hile not required, such a disclaimer is relevant 
to the nominative fair use analysis.”242 
In addition to disclaimers, there are a variety of contextual clues 
that may be relevant in a domain-name trademark case. Using official 
logos and colors and including words like “official” on the site are 
signs of possible infringement. Tabari noted that “[i]magery, logos 
and other visual markers may be particularly significant in 
cyberspace, where anyone can convincingly recreate the look and feel 
of a luxury brand at minimal expense. It’s hard to duplicate a Lexus 
showroom, but it’s easy enough to ape the Lexus site.”243 Courts must 
consider all of these factors in a trademark-infringement analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the temptation to find domain names infringing 
whenever they contain a trademarked term, courts must promote 
trademark law’s historical focus on accuracy and seek updated 
analyses of online-consumer behavior. Tabari offers an updated 
framework to analyze a user’s expectations regarding domain names. 
When a domain name consists of more than a sole trademarked term, 
and it does not contain affirmative suggestions of endorsement or 
 239. See supra notes 184–189 and accompanying text. 
 240. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1182 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 241. Id. at 1177. 
 242. Id. at 1182. 
 243. Id. at 1181. 
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sponsorship, users approach the domain name with a sensible 
agnosticism. Instead of presuming infringement in these cases, courts 
should begin with a consideration of the website’s context and any 
empirical evidence offered by the parties. 
This framework offers greater clarity to website owners seeking 
to reference a trademark in a domain name without suggesting 
sponsorship or endorsement. This clarity would help turn the tide on 
the chilling effect caused by trademark owners’ cease-and-desist 
letters. Although trademark owners may not like all websites that 
reference them, they can attack bad-faith users with other laws, like 
the ACPA and UDRP. For good-faith, honest users, trademark 
owners can respond with public-relations campaigns or other business 
tactics. This updated framework will help ensure that trademark law 
is used as a shield to protect accuracy in the marketplace, rather than 
as a sword to attack legal expressions of speech. 
